Blame cost-cutting not engineering for 737 Max failure

The article by Moshe Y. Vardi (“Why striving for efficiency can be a bad idea,” The Herald, May 23) makes several valid points on modern systems losing resilience in the pursuit of focused efficiency, and its basic premise is not only valid but timely. However, the assumption that Boeing engineering intentionally, and as an engineering design optimization, left a single point failure in a flight critical system appears unfair to the engineering team.

As a retired mechanical engineer who spent his first 20 years in aerospace avionics for aircraft and spacecraft, I can assure you that at every design review (and there are many), rooting out and resolving single-point failures is a high priority. Projects typically spell out “single-point failure analysis” as a documentation requirement.

Design engineers balance requirements between functional (make it work), reliability, manufacturing in both fabrication and assembly areas, part and assembly costs, tooling requirements, supply chain and overall cost of ownership considerations. Review teams typically have representation from engineering, manufacturing, procurement, safety, materials and processes, and finance, as well as some project management oversight.

For an identified single-point failure to progress past design review (or be added in as a cost reduction) would require pressure from those not directly in engineering, as aerospace engineers are opposed down to the DNA level with allowing single-point failure risk in a design. Leaving (or inserting) a single-point failure seems more like an action driven by an inflexible cost target than by an intentional engineering decision.

In my experience working with Boeing in the ’80s and ’90s I have too much respect for their skill levels and professionalism to believe it was an engineering decision that was made without pressure, but is instead a reflection of a culture that shifted from engineering-driven to engineering as a service.

Scott Lee

Snohomish