Difficult questions for all sides in Egypt

The ousting of Egypt’s elected President Mohamed Morsi by the military is a dangerous development that, at the same time, may have saved the country from civil war with potentially much more tragic consequences.

In the year since Egypt’s first democratic elections, both sides — the Islamists and the complex collection of opposition forces — made big miscalculations and mistakes. Lest as Americans we judge the history of our democracy to be superior, it took the Civil War with almost a million dead and more than 100 years before we recognized African-Americans and women as full citizens with equal rights to vote. Now is a time of testing in Egypt, a time of tough questions for all sides and for the U.S. role.

President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood arrogantly interpreted their 51 percent majority victory in the election as a mandate for pressing an Islamist agenda, rather than focusing on Egypt’s desperate economic crisis and pursuing a path of consultation and compromise with the diverse, equally popular opposition. Tough questions for the Islamists include: despite their bitter anger at the military’s intervention, will calmer, more reasoned voices prevail over those advocating blood sacrifice and violence? Assuming the military carries through on its commitment to support a more balanced, inclusive constitution and to hold new elections within a year, will the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the smaller Islamic Salafi Nour Party decide to participate, rather than boycott the political process? In the aftermath of this stunning setback, a remaining basic question for all Egyptian Islamists is this: will they follow the path of Turkey’s Islamist movement and find ways to support practical compromises with more secular political forces, without abandoning their Islamic ideals?

Popular opposition to President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood has not had an overall organization or party and is composed of diverse political forces, including more secular youth, both secular and religious liberals, minority Coptic Christians and former supporters of Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian opposition made the mistake of underestimating the elections’ empowering effect on President Morsi and of acting as if they were the majority. Disadvantaged by their diversity, related to the process of governing, they didn’t work effectively to forge practical compromises with the Muslim Brotherhood. Now, feeling empowered themselves by their very large demonstrations and the military’s intervention on behalf of their demands, tough questions for the opposition forces include: will they will be realistic and fair toward including the Islamists in rebuilding the democratic process and determining government policies? Will they remain divided or form a more coherent political coalition capable of competing effectively in elections? A remaining basic question for the more liberal, secularly oriented opposition is will they, in the spirit of national dialogue and reconciliation, accept working together with the very large numbers of conservative Egyptians who see religion as fundamental to the formation of public policy?

In the wake of ousting the elected president and effectively taking over the reins of power, with the country dangerously divided, the Egyptian military faces the most immediate, tough and urgent questions. Can the military and police prevent larger loss of life and restore relative order and security in the country? So far, despite massive confrontational rallies by the Islamists and the opposition, fewer than 150 people have been killed. Will the military find a way to avoid driving the Muslim Brotherhood underground and, instead, help Egypt’s interim government develop a genuinely inclusive process to revise the constitution and hold new parliamentary elections? And will the military fulfill its promise to withdraw from politics as soon as a democratic political process is reestablished and functioning? A basic, longer range question for the military related to prospects for a more healthy Egyptian economy is will the military’s huge economic holdings be subject to democratic calls for public transparency and accountability?

In 2013, despite Congressional concerns about human rights violations, the Obama administration committed to providing $1.3 billion in aid, mostly to the Egyptian military. This aid gives the United States an important source of leverage, but it’s a sensitive issue because of the history of U.S. relations with Egypt and because U.S. aid to the military reflects a commitment made as part of the Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. The United States certainly should use whatever limited influence we have to urge the military and both the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition forces to halt violence, support a broadly based transitional process, reach agreement on a revised constitution, and move as quickly as possible to hold new parliamentary and presidential elections.

Ron Young is consultant for the National Interreligious Leadership Initiative for Peace in the Middle East. He lives in Everett and can be contacted at usicpme@aol.com.