WASHINGTON — Left on its own, history ambles. But some events spur it to a furious gallop. The force of Sept. 11 as a great accelerator shows now in Europe, where the nature and shape of alliance is changing at warp speed.
Unthinkable yesterday becomes commonplace today. A German chancellor, normally hamstrung by public opinion and an anti-war constitution, sprang forward to offer military help for the U.S. campaign in Central Asia. France, ever mindful of its large Muslim minority and its traditional pro-Arab policy, nonetheless immediately opened its air space to American warplanes and offered to send up to 30 of its own jets for the assault on Afghanistan.
A second round of expansion to extend NATO into the Baltic states has moved from bitter controversy to broad consensus in an eye’s blink. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can now bank on receiving invitations late next year to join NATO, diplomats agree. So can a still-undetermined number of other Central and Eastern European states.
When they clamber aboard a few years later, the new members will find a significantly changed trans-Atlantic alliance. America’s war on global terrorism and Russia’s decision to swallow NATO’s Baltic advance, which will put it onto the territory of the former Soviet Union, will make the alliance a more openly political body than it is today.
"The old Cold War dog responded almost instantaneously" to the terrorist assault, George Robertson, secretary-general of NATO, said with justified pride on his recent Washington visit. But, he added, "that old dog is a very different animal today. … A lot more of its work is political. The network of influence and institutions that has grown up around NATO … is vital to global stability" in ways that go beyond military defense.
"The events of Sept. 11 focused Russia on the fact that there are larger things out there than an obsession with NATO moving into the Baltics," said Robertson. Moscow "had come to understand that strident Russian opposition might make it happen more quickly."
A new stress on non-military tasks also stems from the bifurcated approach the Bush administration is pursuing in its war on global terrorism.
Washington has established a floating coalition of allies, friends, useful strangers and the occasional opportunist to chase Osama bin Laden’s network. But in waging war on Afghanistan, the Pentagon prefers an alliance of one, or at most one and a half.
The United States has gratefully accepted the help of police, intelligence and financial authorities around the globe to track al Qaeda’s operatives, money and plots. Washington has also used the air space, ports and bases of a few nations to get in position to attack.
But the strike force assaulting Afghanistan is essentially an all-American affair, with the important involvement of British commandos.
Paradoxically, after hectoring its European allies for years to get more interested in NATO operating outside Europe, Washington today is setting aside for the time being offers of direct military help from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and others.
The painful memories of command and control coordination problems in the Kosovo air war of 1999 and the Persian Gulf War of 1991 are still fresh. And the remote and fractured nature of the theater of operations in and around Afghanistan makes simpler a lot better.
But European leaders who pushed ahead with offers of support even before knowing what their parliaments would approve are left dangling. Some worry that the initial strong surge of public support will dissipate as images of wounded Afghan civilians flash across television screens. Having their militaries involved would solidify support — or at least muffle dissent.
When the Taliban floated a media-savvy trial balloon by offering talks on bin Laden in return for a U.S. bombing pause — are we sure these guys are medieval fundamentalists emerging from caves? — a leader of Germany’s Green Party quickly praised the idea. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, to his credit, immediately swatted it down and repeated his offer of military help to the Americans.
French President Jacques Chirac has gone further, pushing to get French jets into Uzbekistan and offering French commandos and other specialized units. Thus far these offers are unavailing. Even Britain’s cruise missile and air contributions have been kept to a minimum by U.S. Central Command planners.
Europe has extended meaningful support to a common war led by America. But it has not found a comfortable fit militarily in this effort. Leaving European allies feeling underutilized, underconsulted and perhaps even underappreciated in this global struggle is an outcome that should be avoided, even in history’s gallop.
Jim Hoagland can be reached at The Washington Post Writers Group, 1150 15th St. NW, Washington, DC 20071-9200 or hoaglandj@washpost.com.
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