It was a measure of Prince Saud al-Faisal’s skill as a diplomat that he helped sustain the long friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia through events that could have (and maybe should have) shattered it — an oil embargo, several Arab-Israeli wars, the rise of al-Qaida, the failed U.S. occupation of Iraq and the menace of Iran.
Through it all, Saud did what foreign ministers advocate but rarely achieve: He took the long view. He had been educated at Princeton, and he remained fundamentally pro-American throughout his 40 years as foreign minister. He attached the kingdom to America, and vice versa, for better and sometimes for worse. He had the diplomat’s skill of conciliation. He made inaction seem like a virtue.
Saud, who died Thursday at 75, had the stately appearance of a Bedouin prince of the desert. He was tall and thin, careful in his speech, ascetic in his personal manner. He seemed immune from the swings of optimism and pessimism that often afflict outsiders who deal with the region. He suffered in his later years from Parkinson’s disease, which caused his hands and voice to tremble. The frailty of his body accentuated the precision of what he said.
I interviewed Saud many times. The most poignant encounter was the last, in Riyadh in November 2011. The revolution then known as the “Arab Spring” was raging across the Middle East, toppling governments and bringing havoc, and the Saudi establishment was in a panic of self-preservation. Saud was one of the few Arab leaders who looked past the tumult to the fundamental fact that long-overdue changes were coming and that they could, eventually, be positive.
“It is a great transformation in the Arab world,” he told me. “It is happening in different ways in different countries for different reasons. I think the similarity in these cases is a lack of attention to the will of the people by the governing bodies, and an assumption that they can go on neglecting the will of the people because they control the situation. But you can never avoid what the people want, no matter what government you have.”
Saud wanted Arabs to write their own history, even if they made mistakes. “One doesn’t know what will result from these revolutions,” he said. “A revolution can turn out well: In America, it was a good revolution. But in France, it brought the Reign of Terror. What will happen in our part of the world?” Saud reflected for a moment, and then said: “Whatever decision they take, it will be their decision.”
As for Saudi Arabia, he said, “We will listen to our people and develop accordingly. We are developing, maybe not as quick as a revolution, but we are developing in a way that’s stable.” Four years later, with a new king and a new generation rising to power, the House of Saud continues to defy predictions that it’s on the verge of revolution and collapse.
Saud’s innate caution often frustrated Americans, who wanted the kingdom to be more engaged and active on America’s agenda for the region. U.S. officials often didn’t listen carefully enough. Perhaps the clearest example was Iraq.
I spoke with Saud in April 2003, shortly after the U.S. launched its invasion to topple Saddam Hussein. The Saudi prince seemed to have a premonition that it would fail, that America would overreach.
“We think the worst thing that could happen after a war in Iraq is a military occupation,” he told me. “This would bring all the old images of imperialism, and give truth to what is being presented as an effort by America to rob Iraq of its wealth, rather than to bring peace and stability.” If America tried to use occupied Baghdad as a platform to transform the Arab world, Saud warned that it would be a recipe for “a continuous war.”
Saud’s weakness was that he allowed the kingdom to work with violent groups (sometimes with America’s secret encouragement) to try to check threats. The Saudis supported Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization back when they truly were a terrorist group. They financed the Taliban resistance to Russian occupation in Afghanistan, creating the foundation for what became al-Qaida.
Tragically, the Saudis made a bargain with the most conservative and intolerant strand of Islam, the Wahhabi sect, to maintain the House of Saud in power. To appease their clerics, they allowed them to repress Saudi subjects and to export the extremist brand of Islam to Pakistan, Afghanistan and a dozen other countries.
The Arab-Israeli issue vexed Saud throughout his career. He became foreign minister two years after the 1973 war, and the “peace process” was his perpetual concern. He encouraged American officials to believe that Saudi Arabia might eventually lead to a Muslim acceptance of Israel’s existence through the late King Abdullah’s Arab Peace Initiative, but it never bore fruit.
Saud was a genuinely wise man, but it was clear, listening to him, that wisdom alone isn’t enough to solve problems. If the crises that surrounded the U.S.-Saudi relationship had been addressed by both sides more honestly, the region’s history might have been different. What Saud might have done as king we’ll never know, but he was a uniquely gifted diplomat.
David Ignatius’ email address is davidignatius@washpost.com.
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