In modern war, Congress ignores constitutional duty

WASHINGTON — On this anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, orators are reminding us that December of 1941 was the last time a president asked Congress for a formal declaration of war. The war in Iraq, like all the others since World War II, was fought without such a vote.

The congressional decision in the autumn of last year to authorize the use of force in Iraq remains controversial, as the Democratic presidential candidates who supported it — Rep. Dick Gephardt, and Sens. Joe Lieberman, John Kerry and John Edwards — are criticized by Howard Dean and others who place themselves on the other side.

Louis Fisher, the authority on congressional-executive relations at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, is one who argues that the failure was not personal but institutional. While joining those who challenge the intelligence the Bush administration used to justify the pre-emptive attack on Saddam Hussein’s regime, Fisher is even more critical of the lawmakers who sanctioned the action.

In the fall issue of Political Science Quarterly, he writes: "Month after month, the administration released claims that were unproven" about weapons of mass destruction and links between Iraq and al-Qaida. "For its part, Congress seemed incapable of analyzing a presidential proposal and protecting its institutional powers."

"The decision to go to war," he concludes, "cast a dark shadow over the health of U.S. political institutions and the celebrated system of democratic debate and checks and balances. The dismal performances of the executive and legislative branches raise disturbing questions about the capacity and desire of the United States to function as a republican form of government."

That may seem to you, as it does to me, too sweeping an indictment. But Fisher throws down an important challenge when he zeros in on a pattern of congressional behavior that has seen legislators sidestep the question of peace or war.

He quotes from the House International Relations Committee report supporting the Iraq resolution: "The committee hopes that the use of military force can be avoided. It believes, however, that providing the president with the authority he needs to use force is the best way to avoid its use."

As Fisher notes, that has become a common pattern in dealing with possible conflict. He likens it to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, which Lyndon Johnson used as authority for the escalation in Vietnam.

The problem, he says, is that such legislation "would decide neither for nor against war. That judgment, which the Constitution places in Congress, would now be left in the hands of the president."

Some may say that presidents, with all of their national security apparatus, are better positioned to make the call than 535 members of Congress. But the Constitution says otherwise, that collective wisdom is to be preferred. Because this situation is likely to recur, this is not a personal or partisan question. Congress needs to reassert its role and step up to its responsibility.