WASHINGTON — Although the so-called “war on terrorism” remains a consuming focus of the U.S. government, the Bush administration appears poised to leave behind a situation not unlike the one it inherited nearly eight years ago: a resurgent al-Qaida ensconced in South Asia, training new recruits, plotting attacks against the West and seemingly beyond the United States’ reach.
In dozens of interviews, senior U.S. national security, intelligence and military officials described a counterterrorism campaign in Pakistan that has lost momentum and is beset by frustration.
CIA officers pursuing al-Qaida fighters largely are confined to a collection of crumbling bases in northwestern Pakistan. Most are on remote Pakistani military outposts, where CIA operatives are kept on a short leash under an awkward arrangement with their hosts — rarely allowed to leave and often left with little to do but plead with their Pakistani counterparts to act.
“Everyone who serves in Pakistan comes back frustrated,” a former CIA case officer said. The case officer, like many other officials, spoke on condition of anonymity when describing U.S. efforts in Pakistan because the efforts are highly sensitive and the officials in many cases are not authorized to speak publicly.
Two troubled options define the U.S. approach. The present policy of counting on a politically evolving Pakistan to address the problem could enable al-Qaida to operate relatively unmolested for years. But unilateral American military action, even counterterrorism hard-liners acknowledge, might only compound the militant threat.
Asked what might cause the United States to recalculate its present course, one high-ranking U.S. counterterrorism analyst said, “Obviously, another attack on the homeland.”
The Pakistan connection
An apparent shift in mind-set since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, a step back from policies of pre-emption, despite warnings from the CIA director that al-Qaida’s base in Pakistan represents a “clear and present danger” to the West.
“The similarities between Afghanistan before Sept. 11 and Pakistan today are striking and deeply worrisome,” said Lee Hamilton, who co-chaired the commission that investigated the 2001 strikes. “At what point do you say we cannot tolerate this anymore?”
Despite the apparent parallels, there are key differences. While pre-Sept. 11 Afghanistan was diplomatically isolated and ruled by the harshly fundamentalist Taliban movement, Pakistan has a democratically elected government generally friendly to the West.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, who will meet with President Bush at the White House today, and other senior officials say Pakistan has made great sacrifices in confronting the militants, who use the country’s tribal areas as a springboard for attacks in Pakistan and on Western troops in Afghanistan.
Pakistani officials say more than 1,000 troops have been killed fighting the militants there since the Sept. 11 attacks.
Gillani has pledged more action against Islamic militants, but also has warned that his government would not tolerate foreign troops. As a matter of policy, the Pakistani government does not acknowledge publicly the presence of U.S. covert operatives.
Aspects of U.S. strategy
For now, U.S. strategy centers on two components. Over the long term, the administration has committed hundreds of millions of dollars to aiding Pakistan and improving its military’s capabilities.
In the short term, the pursuit of al-Qaida is built around pressuring Pakistan to be more aggressive, using U.S. special forces teams and Predator planes to carry out surgical strikes and hoping that a few dozen CIA operatives working the region eventually can close in on Osama bin Laden, who is believed to be hiding in the area.
CIA operatives stationed in spartan compounds across the tribal region provide U.S. funding, equipment and intelligence to their Pakistani counterparts. But officials said it is an ongoing struggle to convince the Pakistanis to carry out operations.
On some CIA bases, “It’s just well known that nothing is going to be done,” said the former CIA case officer who served in the region.
The CIA teams in the rugged border region are part of a so-called “surge” launched in 2006 after senior CIA officials had gathered for a tense counterterrorism conference at the agency’s training compound, known as The Farm, near Williamsburg, Va.
“The question was posed, ‘Where is Osama and why haven’t we caught him?”’ said a former CIA officer familiar with the matter. The reply from the agency’s station chief in the Pakistani capital Islamabad reflected frustration.
“Do you have any idea how few officers I actually have?” the station chief said, according to the account of the former officer. “There are more counterterrorism officers in Rome.”
Months later, the agency began moving in as many as 50 additional officers.
The objective was to close in on al-Qaida by going after “not the inner circle, but the second or third tier out,” said a former high-ranking CIA official involved in the decision.
Overall, the CIA has deployed about 200 people to Pakistan, according to current and former officials, making it the agency’s largest overseas operation outside Iraq.
But the CIA is only part of a much broader U.S. intelligence presence in the country. Officials said CIA operatives work alongside officers from the National Security Agency, which intercepts electronic communications, and the National Geospatial Agency, which examines images from spy satellites.
The various agencies have formed a so-called “joint targeting cell” based at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, officials said. The cell pores over data from human and electronic sources to try to find bin Laden and other figures.
Iraq blueprint considered
Searching for fresh ideas, some officials have proposed exporting some of the strategies of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq to Pakistan.
A senior Bush administration official said the National Security Council has spent much of the year debating whether the “awakening” movement in Iraq’s Anbar province could be replicated in the FATA. But discussions have bogged down amid skepticism that the model could work.
In Anbar, the U.S. military persuaded Sunni insurgents to reject al-Qaida in Iraq and form neighborhood security forces paid by the United States. The effort led to a dramatic drop in attacks in Anbar, once the most violent sector of the country.
But the turnaround was aided by U.S. troops that weakened al-Qaida and backed the fledgling patrols. In Pakistan, there are no U.S. forces to back up the few tribal leaders who might be willing to ally themselves with the Americans.
“There’s never going to be an Anbar awakening in the FATA because we’re not there,” said a Pentagon official involved in Pakistan policy. “There’s no awakening unless you’re there to help to wake them up.”
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