Excerpts from material in secret Downing Street memos written in 2002. The information, authenticated by a senior British government official, was transcribed from the original documents. Spellings have been retained.
From a memo dated March 22, 2002, from Peter Ricketts, British foreign office political director, to Jack Straw, Britain’s foreign secretary, on advice given on Iraq to Blair:
“The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11 September. … But even the best survey of Iraq’s WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW (chemical or biological weapon) fronts: the programmes are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know, been stepped up.”
“US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Qaida is so far frankly unconvincing. To get public and Parliamentary support for military operations, we have to be convincing that the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending out troops to die for.”
“We can make the case on qualitative difference (only Iraq has attacked a neighbour, used CW and fired missiles against Israel). The overall strategy needs to include re-doubled effort to tackle other proliferators, including Iran, in other ways (the UK/French ideas on greater IAEA activity are helpful here). But we are still left with a problem of bringing public opinion to accept the imminence of a threat from Iraq.”
“The second problem is the END STATE. Military operations need clear and compelling military objectives. For Kosovo, it was: Serbs out, Kosovars back, peace-keepers in. For Afghanistan, destroying the Taleban and Al Qaida military capability. For Iraq, “regime change” does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam.”
* n n
From a document dated March 8, 2002, on Iraq from the Overseas and Defense Secretariat to Cabinet Office:
“Since 1991, our objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with Saddam Hussein in power.”
“Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD, although our intelligence is poor. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though there is no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will use WMD.”
“The US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering regime change.”
“A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, none currently exists.”
“Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he believes the threat of large scale US military action is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US from acting decisively. Playing for time, he would then embark on a renewed policy of noncooperation.”
“The US has lost confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed. … The US may be willing to work with a much smaller coalition than we think desirable.”
“We have looked at three options for achieving regime change (we dismissed assassination of Saddam Hussein as an option because it would be illegal).”
“Of course, REGIME CHANGE has no basis in international law.”
* n n
From a memo dated March 25, 2002, from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to Blair:
“If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq. In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL (Osama bin Laden) and Al Qaida. Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September. What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community.”
Speaking about the difference between Iraq, Iran and North Korea, he said: “By linking these countries together in the “axis of evil” speech, President Bush implied an identity betwen (sic) them not only in terms of their threat, but also in terms of the action necessary to be done to delink the three, and to show why military action against Iraq is so much more justified than against Iran and North Korea. The heart of this case – that Iraq poses a unique and present danger – rests on the facts.”
“A legal justification is a necessary but far from sufficient precondition for military action. We also have to answer the big question – what will this action achieve? There seems to be a larger hole in this than on anything. Most of the assessments from the US have assumed regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq’s WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime will be better.”
“Iraq has had NO history of democracy, so no one has this habit or experience.”
* n n
From a briefing paper dated July 21, 2002, given to Blair and government officials before meeting on July 23, 2002, about Iraq:
“Even with a legal base and viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective. … A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden.”
* n n
From minutes of a July 23, 2002, meeting between Blair and top government officials. “C” refers to Sir Richard Dearlove, then chief of Britain’s intelligence service:
“C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude (about Iraq). Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.”
“It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.”
From Associated Press
Talk to us
> Give us your news tips.
> Send us a letter to the editor.
> More Herald contact information.
