Iraq planning criticized

WASHINGTON — American military commanders did not impose curfews, halt looting or order Iraqis back to work after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell because U.S. policymakers were reluctant to declare U.S. troops an occupying force, says an internal Army review.

As a result, the Bush administration’s first steps at reconstruction in Iraq were severely hampered, creating a power vacuum that others quickly moved to fill, and a growing mistrust on the part of ordinary Iraqis, the report said.

Since those first days, the U.S. effort in Iraq has been hampered by a growing insurgency with persistent and deadly attacks against U.S. forces.

The review, a postwar self-evaluation by the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), said the political decision to call the U.S. forces that arrived in Baghdad "liberators" instead of "occupying forces" left the division’s officers uncertain about their legal authority in postwar Baghdad and other cities. Under international law, the report says, the troops were indeed an occupation force and had both rights and responsibilities.

A spokesman for the 3rd Infantry Division, Maj. Darryl Wright, characterized the report as a candid effort to find ways to improve the division the next time it is called to fight. Its authors are not identified.

In the section regarding legal matters facing the division, the report said unidentified "higher officials" constrained the occupation effort and did not prepare for the fall of Hussein’s government.

"Despite the virtual certainty that the military would accomplish the regime change, there was no plan for oversight and reconstruction, even after the division arrived in Baghdad," the report says. "State, Defense, and other relevant agencies must do a better and timelier job planning occupation governance and standing up a new Iraqi government."

The division confiscated $1 billion from palaces in Baghdad, but was not permitted to use that money to help the city get back on its feet, despite having the legal authority to do so, the report says.

"The money could have been used to hire, train, and equip the police force; clear the rubble from government buildings and city streets; hire sanitation workers and other municipal employees; clean up the courts and hire judicial personnel. … At first, the people were anxious to get started and looked to the U.S. for assistance. They soon saw us as being unable or unwilling to get anything done," the report says.

The hunt for evidence of Hussein’s alleged chemical, biological and nuclear programs — the Bush administration’s key reason for going to war — also was problematic from the start, the report says.

"During the transition from combat operations to support and stability operations, we did not attempt to secure these key facilities before looting started," the report says. "The visible clues that may have provided a detailed analysis on WMD production, research and development, or storage were either destroyed or carried away by the local populace."

The report recommends troops be sent to quickly secure such sites during future conflicts.